The authors have aimed to produce a theoretical model which considers the choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions. To this end, they have analysed the current litigation pattern (and litigants' strategies). On this basis, the specific issues which arise in cross-border EU competition law actions have been identified with a view to proposing an appropriate course for any reform in the area. A mix of research methods have been used -in addition to employing traditional library based legal research methods, opinions of legal practitioners from England and Germany and policy-makers from Brussels have been considered. The article demonstrates that, given the diverse nature of the European Union, a new mode of governance should be used by the EU legislator in order to close the EU competition law enforcement gap. The authors suggest that Regulation 1/2003 should incorporate a specifically designated private international law mechanism which promotes inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU competition law dispute resolution, and produces efficient enforcement results in a multi-level system of governance. It has been submitted that some of the specific problems that arise may be best addressed by appropriately drafted private international rules which address inter alia the low mobility of consumers and SMEs.
exercise of rights conferred by EU law'. 16 Given the fact that the problem is not dealt with at the EU level, the principle of national procedural autonomy 17 might suggest not only that it is for a national domestic system to deal with the issue of damages, but also that it is for national law to decide what would be the set of procedural rules which would be employed in this context. The lack of harmonisation may suggest that the EU competition law claims may be characterised by a high level of uncertainty 18 in so far as such claims would be often crossborder in nature which suggests that "knowledge of [several] legal systems is required". 19 It has been submitted that " [i] t is troublesome for the litigants who will have to go through the often difficult procedure of ascertaining and applying foreign law. In many cases, the variation of the substantive laws in Europe is a true non-tariff trade barrier."
20
Previous comparative studies -revealed by the Ashurst Report 21 as well as by the Collective Antitrust Redress Report 22 -strongly suggest that harmonisation must be considered by the EU legislator. 23 The academic debate was recently renewed by the authors of the collective redress report who made a case for procedural harmonisation 24 at EU level.
25
Such a deduction can be further strengthened by noting that "it is readily apparent that inadequate national remedies and procedural rules can frustrate the effective application of [Union] untenable. However, the European Court's attempt to accommodate differences in national procedural law means that some variations will occur." 27 The European Commission has agreed upon a package of legislative proposals with a view to providing for an effective EU competition law enforcement regime in Europe. 28 More specifically, the Commission has put forward a proposal for a Directive on certain rules governing actions for damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the European Union. 29 The corrigendum of the text of the Directive, which was adopted by the European Parliament, was very recently formally approved by the EU Council of Ministers. 30 The Directive is complemented by a Recommendation on common principles for injunctive and compensatory collective redress in the Member States concerning violation of rights granted under Union Law 31 as well as by a
Communication on quantifying harm in actions based on breaches of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU. 32 In this context, the European Commission has justified approximation of national substantive and procedure rules at EU level as follows: "To ensure a more level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market and to improve the conditions for injured parties to exercise the rights they derive from the internal market, it is therefore appropriate to increase legal certainty and to reduce the differences between the Member States as to the national rules governing actions for antitrust damages"
33
How appropriately may the level of variation with regard to the various national regimes be addressed by the Directive for antitrust damage actions? The authors demonstrate that a major challenge for the policy-makers relates to the governance aspects of EU competition law litigation 34 which must be addressed head-on with a view to closing the enforcement gap in a cross-border context. 30 See Corrigendum to the position of the Parliament, Adopted without a vote on 21 October 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/damages_directive_corrigendum_en.pdf >. See also:
The European Commission -Press Release < http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-1580_en.htm >. 31 [2013] OJ L201/60. 32 [2013] OJ C167/19. 33 Explanatory Memorandum -Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, p 10. 34 The paper is concerned with the damage claims arising out of competition law infringements (cartels or abuse of dominant position). 35 Commission Staff Working Document, Impact Assessment Report, Damage actions for breach of the EU antitrust rules, SWD(2013) 203 final.
mode of "governance" 36 should be used with a view to setting up an effective enforcement regime in Europe, and addressing the specific problems that arise in a cross-border context.
The European Commission 37 has identified the five principles, which would be essential for an appropriately designed good governance system, as being "openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence." 38 In his analysis of the new modes of EU governance, Armstrong has noted that " [t] here is a relative agreement on 'hierarchy' or 'competition' as distinct modes of governance." 39 Furthermore, Muir-Watt and Arroyo's forthcoming edited book "explores the potential of private international law to reassert a significant governance function in respect of new forms of authority beyond the state." 40 With this in mind, a choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition actions may be the key for closing the enforcement gap in Europe. In this context, one should make a distinction between a unified/centralised system (which might include unified/hierarchical enforcement regime), on the one hand, and a level of managed harmonisation (setting up common principles and minimum standards) which presupposes an effectively functioning private international law regime, on the other hand. Bearing in mind this distinction, one could say that a private international law regime which promotes interjurisdictional regulatory competition should be used as a new mode of governance, in order to complement the proposed legislative package in the area of EU competition law. Although it could be questioned to some extent whether it is relevant to refer to "regulatory competition"
in the area as long as the relevant EU competition law requires a uniform interpretation as a matter of EU law, the cross-border nature of EU competition law infringements and the level of variation regarding the conditions for bringing such actions 41 as well as the important role of Member States cumulatively suggest that some Member States' courts might be better equipped (than others) to deal with such actions. Hence, a private international law regime, which promotes inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition, might be a useful mode of 36 It has been submitted that "The term 'governance' is used in relation to national, European and international orders, and it crosses the public-private divide. The question whether an efficient EU private international law framework could be important "for the functioning of the internal market, and at the same time for the preservation of diversity in national private law" 44 should be investigated in the light of the multi-level governance system in the EU. Private international law instruments are normally seen as an appropriate legislative tool, which may be used to preserve the inherent characteristics of the diverse legal systems within the EU, but can PIL be used as a mode of governance which promotes regulatory competition 45 in cross-border competition cases? Before addressing this question, the employed research methodology will be briefly introduced. Then, the main modes of governance available will be introduced along with the challenges the EU policy-makers face when devising a policy governing the cross-border EU competition law enforcement activities. After that, the important issues which affect the claimants/defendants' tactics will be specified. On this basis, the authors will propose a theoretical model which may be used to govern cross-border EU competition law enforcement activities with a view to closing the enforcement gap and providing redress for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law infringement. Finally, some issues, which need to be considered in a wider European context, will be put forward.
B. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 46
Since the paper aims to consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions, it is important to use a research methodology which allows the authors to define the cross-border competition litigation pattern. 47 Indeed, the cross-border nature of many EU competition law infringements seemingly suggests that the way the current framework shapes the claimants' tactics would be important with a view to making a case for reform (and identifying an appropriate mode of governance 48 ).
In addition to employing traditional library based legal research methods, the authors thought that it would be useful to have the opinions of policy-makers and legal practitioners, to consider their views on how private EU competition law actions are functioning at the moment and how they could and should be developed. Indeed, part of the problem, which is identified by some of the studies 49 so far, is that there are not many cases at present. 50 Given that the study aims to identify how the cross-border EU competition law actions should be accommodated 51 The interview questions focused on six key areas: 1) General questions about competition law disputes; 2) Plaintiffs' tactics in cross-border EU competition law cases; 3) Defendants' tactics and settlement; 4) Follow-on actions and quantification of damages; 5) Procedural issues; 6) Policy issues. These provided a structure to interviews. That said, the interviewer and/or interviewee were always free to depart from the structure if the participants' viewpoints and experience were thereby better expressed. That said, it should be clearly noted that the so gathered empirical data will be only briefly presented in this paper with a view to producing a theoretical model, which does consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions by addressing the specific issues that affect the litigants' strategies. As a result, it is not the intention of this article to present the empirical data systematically as this has been done in an edited collection of papers produced within the project framework, 68 but it rather aims to consider the choice of governance design of cross-border EU competition law actions.
C. GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION LAW LITIGATION:

MAIN CHALLENGES FOR POLICY-MAKERS
Before looking at the main issues which affect the suing decisions of potential litigants, the main challenges, which affect the governance aspects of cross-border competition litigation, will be presented. A difficult task for the EU policy-makers in the area of competition law (similarly, as the one for the EU 69 itself) is the process of creation of a European enforcement regime "which is based on the existing diversity of member states"' 70 legal orders.
The fact that the cause of action for EU competition law damages is a mixture of EU law and Member States' laws may be justified by the "political and legal reality" in the Union. 71 The latter aims to strike a balance between the requirement of consistent enforcement of EU competition law across Europe, on the one hand, and the Member States' competence in matters of procedure broadly defined to cover the issues of causation and remedies, on the other hand. 72 However, is such an approach not prone to undermine the Europe. This is so because "common principles of interpretation and a common legal culture" take some time to develop. 82 It seems that this could be an issue in a Union which has recently enlarged to encompass 28 Member States.
More importantly, a harmonised instrument without an appropriate institutional structure might bring fresh uncertainty across Europe. It has been submitted that:
"in the absence of a federal court system, it will not be possible to ensure consistent interpretation, application and enforcement of [any harmonised instrument]. All these problems of consistency and effectiveness are, of course, exacerbated by the fact that Europe is multilingual territory." proposed Directive clearly suggests that adoption of a unified/cenrtalised system (which might include a unified/hierarchical enforcement regime) is not on the agenda for anyone.
A PIL Mode of Governance: Inter-jurisdictional Regulatory Competition
Another mode of governance may be promoting regulatory competition. Such a mode of governance pre-supposes two elements. First, common principles may be set up by the EU Hence, the Union policy-maker appears to believe that a national legislator may be best procedural/substantive laws of the jurisdiction where the claim is brought by relying on the law of the forum (lex fori).
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The possibility for regulatory competition in Europe with regard to EU competition law damages claims was first signalled by the authors of the report Making Antitrust Damages Actions More Effective in the EU. 98 Although the authors of the report appear to be placing a significant importance on the applicable laws under Rome II, Article 1(3) states that the Regulation does not apply to evidence and procedure. Establishing jurisdiction in one forum rather than another would be important in so far as this would indicate the set of procedural rules which should apply in this context. 99 The significance of the law of the forum could be further strengthened by making reference to Art 6(3)( 
D. THE CURRENT MODE OF GOVERNANCE: ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED
As the current regime appears to be shaping litigants strategies, in this section, a brief summary will be provided of the qualitative interview data 110 which may be indicative as to the important issues which appear to be affecting and shaping the litigants' tactics under the current regime. An analysis of the current mode of governance of cross-border EU litigation appears to suggest that there are three main aspects which are seemingly important for the policy-makers to consider with a view to providing for the "effective enforcement of EU competition law". 111 First, the problems surrounding two-step adjudication structure, in which arguably a regulator is better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better placed to award damages, 112 should be identified under the current competition law enforcement regime. Secondly, the problems surrounding the jurisdictional differences and litigants' strategies must be considered. Thirdly, the specific problems regarding consumer claims must be considered with a view to close the enforcement gap in Europe.
The Enforcement Pattern and Litigants' Strategies in the EU Context
In the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the proposed Directive for antitrust damages actions, the European Commission has noted that "[t]he overall enforcement of the EU competition rules is best guaranteed through complementary public and private enforcement.
However, the existing legal framework does not properly regulate the interaction between the two strands of EU competition law enforcement." 113 How does the current enforcement pattern affect litigants' strategies?
In an analysis of the current institutional architecture of EU competition law enforcement, Wils has noted:
"public antitrust enforcement is the superior instrument to pursue the objectives of clarification and development of the law and of deterrence and punishment, whereas private actions for damages are superior for the pursuit of corrective justice through compensation, then the optimal antitrust enforcement would appear to be a system in which public antitrust enforcement aims at clarification and development of the law and at deterrence and punishment, while private actions for damages aim at compensation." Although, the qualitative interview data appear to suggest that competition litigation is picking up in England as well as in Germany, a closer look at the collected data shows that the majority of the participants are of the view that the increase is only in respect of follow-on actions. This view re-appeared despite the fact that the interview questions were broadly drafted and there were no questions which were asking the participants whether the increase is in respect of follow-on or standalone actions. Despite this, the respondents from England and 117 See more Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 118 Kammin and Becker, supra n 8. 119 Provimi, supra n 7; Devenish, supra n 7; JJB Sports, supra n 7; Cooper Tire, supra n 10; Pfleiderer, supra n 7; Toshiba Carrier, supra n 10; National Grid, supra n 10; Deutsche Bahn, supra n 10; Nokia, supra n 10;
The prevalent strategy employed by injured parties clearly indicates that the current enforcement pattern is characterised by a two-step adjudication. It should be noted that the respondents were asked if a person, who is adversely affected by an infringement, would launch a complaint with a competition authority or whether he would rather bring a private action and seek damages before national courts. It appears that the majority of the participants expresses the view that going to the competition authority first would be a normal strategy. 134 appears to suggest that an important question, in a cross-border context, is whether a Member State court is entitled to refuse the recognition of a decision taken by a foreign national competition authority that does not respect due process rules in its adoption. 135 While a national court would apply civil procedure rules that presuppose respect of due process, an NCA would apply administrative procedure rules that could potentially raise concerns as to the undertaking's right to a fair trial and hearing. 136 Thirdly, even if the regulator had respected the due process rules in the adoption of its decision, the two-step adjudication process would create specific problems when it comes to imposing personal liability for EU competition law infringements in a cross-border context. In particular, Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are meant to prevent anti-competitive "activities of undertakings." 137 However, the concept of undertaking used by the regulator when establishing an infringement, and the fact that most multinational businesses would involve not a single legal entity, but groups of companies, suggests that there are specific problems which must be addressed with regard to private proceedings. In particular, whilst, "a rebuttable presumption that the parent company does in fact exercise a decisive influence over the conduct of its subsidiary" 138 144 Toshiba Carrier, supra n 10. In this case, the claimants sought damages against the defendants, who were involved in a complex of anti-competitive agreements and concerted practices consisting of price fixing and market sharing in the industrial tubes sector. The infringement was detected and established by a decision of the actions against subsidiaries that were not mentioned in the operative part of the Commission decision. In other words, any mode of governance must inter alia take account of the crossborder aspects of EU competition law infringements with a view to setting up an efficient enforcement regime. Indeed, the governance aspects of cross-border EU competition law enforcement activities would be important in view of the important jurisdictional differences which would be perceived as important by litigants in a cross-border context.
Jurisdictional Differences and Litigants' Strategies in the EU Context
Given the importance of the law of procedure for the litigants in EU competition law claims, the authors were particularly interested in the existence of procedural advantages for a claimant to bring his EU competition law action in one Member State rather than another. The issues are seemingly important in the light of the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the recent Proposal for a Directive for Antitrust Damage Actions, in which the drafters have stated that:
"Because of th[e] marked diversity of national legislations, the rules applicable in some Member States are considered by claimants to be much more suitable for bringing an antitrust damages action in those Member States rather than in others. These differences lead to inequalities and uncertainty concerning the conditions under which injured parties, both citizens and businesses, can exercise the right to compensation they derive from the Treaty, and effect the effectiveness of such right. Indeed, where the jurisdictional rules allow a claimant to bring its action in one of those 'favourable' Member States and where that claimant has the necessary resources and incentives to do so, it is thus far more likely to effectively exercise its EU right to compensation than when it cannot do so"
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The law of the forum of the country where the action is brought may play an important role because, as noted elsewhere, 146 the question 'whether certain evidence proves a certain fact … is to be determined by the law of the country where the question arises.' 147 The answer to this question in many cases would be pre-determined by establishing jurisdiction in the injured party's preferred forum. This text could be interpreted as leaving the domestic legal system of each Member
State to determine what the 'required legal standard' of proof is. 151 In other words, the standard of proof is to be determined by the law of the court where proceedings have been brought. 152 The answer to the question whether jurisdiction variations make a difference for an injured party bringing a cross-border EU competition law claim brought in an enlarged
Europe was important in so far as it has been noted that "the age-old gap between the procedural families in Europe, especially the gap between the Civil Law and Common Law countries, has been reduced in size." 153 The gathered data clearly illustrates that procedural differences matter with regard to cross-border EU competition law actions brought in the European context. In particular, as already noted, 29 respondents from England and Germany thought that injured parties could gain some procedural (and/or substantive law) advantages by bringing their claim in one jurisdiction rather than another. 154 This finds support in the case law 155 which clearly shows that issue of jurisdiction could be a subject of heated debates before the courts. 156 The most important procedural aspects can be summarised as: disclosure; speed of proceedings; and standard of proof. In particular, on 17 occasions in England and on 11 occasions in Germany, the disclosure rules were mentioned as a very important procedural aspect which could influence a claimant's decision where to bring an EU competition law action. The latter point may be strengthened by the Commission's observation that "the lack of adequate rules on the disclosure of documents […] for an award to be made, or for an injured party to force a settlement) was considered to be an important factor; this was submitted on 15 occasions (12 occasions in England and 3 occasions in Germany). Thirdly, the standard of proof was mentioned as a decisive factor by one participant from Germany, and as an important factor by one participant in England as well.
In view of the foregoing, one should say that the relative importance of the procedural rules reinforces the suggestion that a national legislator is best placed to address the problems. 166 Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 167 e.g. jurisdictional challenges -Provimi, supra n 7; Cooper Tire, supra n 10; leniency documents: Pfleiderer, supra n 7; National Grid, supra n 10. 168 Danov and Dnes, supra n 8. 169 Provimi, supra n 7; Cooper Tire, supra n 10; Toshiba Carrier, supra n 10; National Grid, supra n 10; Nokia, supra n 10. and one from Norway; on the defendant's side there were three defendants from Germany, one from the UK, one from Austria and one from France. 173 In the circumstances, the claim was brought under Article 6(1) of Brussels I, which is specifically designed for multidefendant cases. It states that:
"a person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued [,] where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings."
The rationale of Article 6(1) is to centralise litigation against all defendants in one Member State and avoid the risk of (potentially) However, to rely on Article 6(1) an injured party has to establish a "good arguable case" that the English court has jurisdiction, and that the requirements of Article 6(1) Brussels I have been satisfied. 176 To this end, it must be shown that "there is a real issue between the Claimants and one of the Anchor Defendants, that is, an issue which cannot be struck out." 177 In Deutsche Bahn AG v Morgan, there was only one UK defendant, Morgan. Morgan defeated the claimants' strategy to centralise litigation in the UK by bringing an "application to have the claim against it struck out on the ground that it has been brought out of time." 178 The application, which succeeded before the Competition Appeal Tribunal, 179 was subsequently rejected by the English Court of Appeal. 180 Nonetheless, the Supreme Court granted to Morgan a permission to appeal against the decision of the Court of Appeal.
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In the circumstances, the UK claimants had to change their tactics. In particular, they sought from the Competition Appeal Tribunal to lift the stay to their claims against the other five defendants. 182 They had to base their damage claims on Article 5(3) of Brussels I rather than Article 6(1). The UK claimants' application for a limited lifting of the stay was granted. 183 In this context, the CAT held that "[j]urisdiction is supposed to be determined swiftly and efficiently at the outset of proceedings […] ." 184 With this in mind, one should say that the growing number of jurisdiction challenges before the UK courts does suggest that there are some important issues with respect to governance aspects of cross-border EU competition law claims which must be addressed head-on by the EU policy-makers.
Specific Aspects in Relation to Consumer Claims
The high costs, which could be fuelled by the high level of uncertainty in cross-border EU competition law proceedings, 185 may potentially deter claims brought by consumers and SMEs in so far as litigation costs/risks are important factors to be considered in claims brought by consumers and SMEs who may be prone to economise (unless they have a funding scheme in place) on the costs by bringing claims in their home states. 186 Six out of 11 interviewees from Germany thought that it would be beneficial for plaintiffs to sue in their home state. Many participants from England made a clear distinction between claims brought by consumers and SMEs, on the one hand, and claims brought by big companies, on the other hand. On nine occasions in England, it was submitted that it would be beneficial especially Litigation. 190 They have noted that there are three important issues which need to be carefully considered by the policy-makers with a view to closing the enforcement gap. First, the fact that there would be multiple victims of EU competition law infringements in various countries is an important issue which needs to be carefully considered. Secondly, the numerous victims would have suffered different levels of damages, and, as a result, they may have different interests in so far as those affected by an EU competition law infringement may be up or down in the chain of distribution (i.e. passing on or absorbing the inflated price).
Thirdly, consumers, who would normally absorb the loss, would be reluctant to bring such actions due to the negligible amount of damages suffered by them in comparison with the high litigation costs. 191 The difficulties have been clearly noted in Recital 31 of the Proposed Directive which acknowledges that "it may be particularly difficult for consumers or undertakings that did not themselves make any purchase from the infringing undertaking to prove the scope of that harm."
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Thus, there is certainly a case for reform. In particular, given that most EU competition law infringements are cross-border in nature (affecting consumers and businesses in a number of Member States), one could convincingly argue that that evidential hurdles and issues of binding effect of administrative decisions adopted at national level must be carefully 187 Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions, p 9. 188 M Danov, D Fairgrieve and G Howells, "Collective Redress Antitrust Proceedings: How to Close the Enforcement gap and provide redress for consumers" in Danov, Becker and Beaumont, supra n 2, 253-282. 189 Emerald, supra n 7. considered by policy-makers along with the issues of litigants' mobility and the possibility for irreconcilable judgments/decisions across jurisdictions.
E. THE NEW MODE: GOVERNANCE ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER EU COMPETITION LAW ACTIONS IN EUROPE
How should the Union exercise its competence? Art 5 TEU defines the limits of Union competences, and lays down the principles which should be used by the EU legislator when deciding how to exercise its competence. 193 The Explanatory Memorandum specifies that:
"[the proposed Directive] is based on both Articles 103 and 114 of the Treaty, because it pursues two equally important goals which are inextricably linked, namely (a) to give effect to the principles set out in Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty and (b) to ensure a more level playing field for undertakings operating in the internal market, and to make it easier for citizens and businesses to make use of the rights they derive from the internal market." 194 However, given the cross-border implication of most EU competition law infringements, which would affect consumers and businesses in a number of Member States, the policy-makers should consider whether Article 81 TFEU, which confers the EU competence in all private international law matters with a cross-border element, 195 should not be used as an appropriate legislative basis for other legislative measures aiming to promote regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust damages claims. The significant majority of our respondents are against a reform at EU level and in favour of a system of regulatory competition between procedural and substantive law regimes. In other words, the respondents appear to favour inter-jurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution to attract claimants and produce efficient enforcement results. It is well established that "[i]n the absence of centrally drafted uniform rules, free movement enables regulatory competition between legal orders." 196 In view of that, one would have thought that the best way forward may be for the Union to encourage Member States to legislate on antitrust dispute resolution. 197 This also appears to be the spirit of the Proposed Directive in so far as it leaves the Member States a level of flexibility with a view to implementing the proposed measures, "while leaving room for individual Member States to go further, should they wish so".
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How should the EU "govern" cross-border EU competition actions? How should the EU legislator devise the relevant framework with a view to closing the enforcement gap and providing redress for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law infringement?
One
Step Adjudication -Closing the Enforcement Gap While providing for
Certainty and Consistency
As it was demonstrated, 199 a two-step adjudication process, in which arguably a regulator is better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better placed to award damages 200 does affect the litigants' tactics. It leaves an enforcement gap in so far as the regulators across Europe would not have the resources to investigate all the EU competition law infringements. 201 The evidential hurdles in follow-on actions may be seen as a deterrent for some injured parties because a "problem arises where, in the infringement decision, the competition authority is using the facts found by it to drive a particular theory, which may cause difficulties in a follow-on action if it becomes necessary to link the infringement to the facts of the case and, more particularly, the facts relating to causation and (including the leniency material) was not compiled for this purpose and may therefore be of concerns as to the undertaking's right to a fair hearing. 218 Nazzini has argued that 'the current EU competition enforcement regime, which is characterized by an administrative decisionmaker with no guarantees of independence and impartiality and deferential judicial review, is unconstitutional.' 219 In view of that, mechanisms allowing for some form of consolidation of the two sets of proceedings before national courts 220 might be desirable as the national courts would be best placed to be a major venue for competition law actions, if adequately supported by the NCAs and the European Commission.
Judge Pelikánová 221 addresses the problems by suggesting that the legislator should "leave to the European Commission solely the inquiry, with the duty to introduce a criminal or civil action before the Court. The system would better fulfil the requirements of the ECHR". 222 Indeed, an one-step adjudication regime might be necessary if the EU legislator aims to provide an "effective remedy" 223 for those who have suffered harm as a result of an EU competition law infringement. As noted elsewhere, 224 it may be far from efficient to have one set of proceedings before an NCA in order to establish a breach of competition law, and another set of proceedings before Member State courts in order for a claimant to prove that damage has been caused to him. 225 The procedural inefficiencies of the current two-step adjudication (i.e. before the regulator, and before the courts) increases uncertainty, which can fuel litigation costs, and could fly in the face of Article 47(1) of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights.
An one-step adjudication regime may be useful with a view to addressing the problems before the courts in follow-on actions brought against defendants, who, despite being a part of an infringing undertaking, are not named in the operative part of the Commission's infringement decision (i.e. dispositif). 226 Moreover, the consolidation of proceedings before the national courts may be necessary if the EU legislator wants to make sure that the extent to which a company has made redress is taken into account by the competent authorities when determining what level of fine to impose. 227 There is no scope for offsetting fines and damages in the current system. 228 A public enforcement action would normally precede a damages action. The level of damages would be far from certain at the stage when an authority decides on the level of fines. Similarly, in a follow-on action, the court is supposed to award damages which would compensate the victim/s irrespective of the fine imposed by the competition authority. This clearly shows that there is limited scope for consolidation of the fines and the damages in the current system, and consolidating both procedures before the national courts might be a good way to achieve this. 229 One might question the desirability of consolidating the proceedings by putting forward that the objective of the fine (i.e. punish and deter) is different from the objective of the damages (i.e. compensation). However, in response to this, it might be suggested that an efficient enforcement policy would presuppose for all enforcement objectives (i.e. injunctive; punitive; compensatory) 230 to be adequately pursued in consolidated proceedings. In other words, there seems to be a strong case that an efficient regime, which allows for all enforcement objectives to be pursued in one set of proceedings rather than in two sets of proceedings, might be the more appropriate way forward.
The foregoing issues must be addressed head-on in Government has therefore decided that the 'opt-out' aspect of a claim will only apply to UK-domiciled claimants […] ." 236 The Consumer Rights Bill, 237 brought forward a proposed amendment to Competition Act 1998, and went on specifying that:
'"Opt-out collective proceedings" are collective proceedings which are brought on behalf of each class member except-(a) any class member who opts out by notifying the representative, in a manner and by a time specified, that the claim should not be included in the collective proceedings, and (b) any class member who-(i) is not domiciled in the United Kingdom at a time specified, and (ii) does not, in a manner and by a time specified, opt in by notifying the representative that the claim should be included in the collective proceedings." 238 An consumers and bring representative actions aggregating numerous relatively small damage claims on behalf of the consumers on an opt-out basis. However, even if an opt-out regime were introduced, the consumer associations may not be well placed to bring EU competition law damages claims in cases where "consumers do not buy directly from manufacturers but instead from middlemen". 244 In particular, there may be evidential hurdles in claims brought on behalf of consumers as many of them may not keep their sale receipts, for example. The "evidential difficulties (in the sense that it may be difficult to prove to the satisfaction of the court the facts that do exist, or would have existed in the 'no cartel' world)" 245 have been put forward before the High Court by counsel in Devenish 246 where the claims were brought by companies. The evidential hurdles in claims by consumers would be exacerbated by the difficulties caused by the fact that the damage suffered by an individual consumer may be very difficult to ascertain as its amount may indeed be negligible in some cases. 247 For
example, this appears to be the case in Emerald. 248 If one assumes that the claimants, who were cut flowers' importers, have passed the overcharge down to the end buyer of a bouquet of cut flowers, then it would be far from easy to ascertain how much of the price of the bouquet was increased as a result of the overcharge, in order for it to be claimed back by the individual consumers. Another case which may be used to illustrate the difficulties is
Devenish. If one assumes that the cartel-induced overcharge in selling a unit of vitamins to Devenish Nutrition was £40 249 and the cartelised product was purchased by them to manufacture speciality products for the intensive livestock sector, then how much of the cartel-induced overcharge contributes to the raised price which is ultimately paid by the end consumer? 250 It is beyond doubt that if a claim is brought by the end consumer, then "the nonassessable cost of responding to discovery and the like will substantially erode, if not exceed, any recovery." 251 Bearing in mind that, due to high litigation costs, it is the large companies that generally appear to be bringing EU competition law damages actions, it has been suggested that one way of closing the enforcement gap in Europe would be to allow large purchasers, for example, to aggregate claims on behalf of purchasers down the chain of distribution (including end consumers). 252 Such a solution would not only address the passing-on problems (as identified by the Commission), 253 but it also would allow large companies to aggregate claims on behalf of consumers of a cartelised product and/or consumers who are paying a monopoly price. In such cases, a gatekeeping role will be performed by the judges who would exercise judicial control over the cases at the certification stage. The volume of sales of the large purchasers, who have opted into the collective redress proceedings, can be an objective criterion in assessing their adequacy to act as representatives of the end consumers who would be involved on an opt-out basis. Such a proposal inter alia would address some of the problems regarding the passing-on defence. 254 To this end, it would be essential to have an appropriately devised certification regime which requires a judge to been sold. 255 How to address the low mobility of consumers and SMEs, which, due to the high cross-border litigation costs, may defeat any regime that aims to promote regulatory competition?
Once an effective redress mechanism had been implemented, the issue of mobility of large purchasers (and consumer organisations) could be addressed by an appropriately drafted private international law mechanism which would be best incorporated in Regulation 1/2003.
Although it would be difficult to elaborate a special basis for jurisdiction which requires a substantial connection between the breach of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU and the effects of the anti-competitive agreement or conduct within the territory of the Member State where the action is brought and in respect of which the EU antitrust law claim is brought, 256 there is a need for a jurisdiction rule which allows an injured party to centralise litigation against a group of the same companies before the courts at his preferred jurisdiction. Where, for example, there is a corporate group with numerous subsidiaries (all of whom form a single infringing undertaking), then it should be open for an injured party by establishing jurisdiction against one of the subsidiaries to centralise litigation against the whole group of companies as well as against the other group/s of companies who were party to the same anti-competitive agreement. This could be justified by the fact that EU competition law infringements would often directly and substantially affect the markets in several countries and/or regions.
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Such a broad jurisdiction rule must be accompanied by appropriately drafted rules which allow the parties to avoid parallel EU competition law proceedings, and centralise litigation before the court that is clearly appropriate to deal with the case, avoiding the problem of irreconcilable or inconsistent judgments. Indeed, ensuring finality of judgments presupposes an appropriately designed mechanism which allows the parties to avoid parallel Another specific issue, which needs to be addressed by the EU legislator in a revised 262 Hence, the European Commission's efforts to close the enforcement gap, which would be important for Europe to achieve sustainable economic growth, as well as the policy-makers' impetus to provide redress for those, who have suffered damages as a result of an EU competition law infringement, by encouraging collective redress antitrust proceedings in Europe might be strong arguments favouring the proposed approach. 263 Therefore, there is a strong case that an efficient EU private international law regime would be crucial to devising an appropriate governance mode and providing effective remedies for victims of EU competition law infringements in a cross-border context.
F. CONCLUSION: OTHER ISSUES TO BE ADDRESSED IN A BROADER EUROPEAN
CONTEXT
The European Commission's package of legislative proposals may be regarded as an important step towards the creation of an effective EU competition law enforcement regime in Europe. Given the diverse nature of the European Union and in the light of the proposed Directive, it seems that a private international law mechanism which promotes interjurisdictional regulatory competition in the area of EU antitrust law dispute resolution may need to be employed by the EU legislator as a new mode of governance which might produce efficient enforcement results in a multi-level system of governance. Also, one-stop adjudication must replace the current two-step adjudication enforcement regime, in which arguably a regulator is better placed to detect and establish an infringement and, subsequently, a court is better placed to award damages. 264 Although, the proposed Directive and the relative importance of the procedural rules might suggest that a national legislator could be best placed to address the problems, the low mobility of consumers and SMEs, which may defeat any regime that aims to promote regulatory competition, must be addressed by appropriately drafted private international rules which should be incorporated in Regulation 267 The current institutional architecture might need to be reviewed if the EU legislator decided to employ a more sophisticated private international law mechanism when allocating jurisdiction and identifying the applicable law in cross-border private EU competition law actions, which seem to pose particularly acute problems under the current system. 268 Indeed, the increased importance of private international law for disputes in civil and commercial matters, which may affect businesses, consumers and families, raises concerns as to the costs of cross-border litigation as well as to the uniform application of the various private international law instruments across the Member States within the EU. This could potentially undermine the rule of law because the high costs and the high level of uncertainty could adversely affect cross-border claimants' litigiousness as a number of injured parties may believe that the risks of litigation outweigh the benefits. 269 Such an outcome would fly in
